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Summary
The ongoing crisis in Darfur  in western Sudan has led to a major humanitarian
disaster, with an estimated 1.5  million people displaced and more than 200,000
refugees forced into neighboring Chad.  While there are no reliable estimates of the
number of people killed as a result of the conflict, some observers estimate that up
to 70,000 people have been killed from 2003 to the present. The government of
Sudan has denied  or severely  restricted access to international relief officials in
Darfur, although some aid is now flowing to the area.  Violence against civilians,
however, continues unabated, according to United Nations officials.  U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID) officials assert that up to 320,000 could die by
the end of 2004, irrespective of the international response. 
In August 2004, the African Union deployed 305 troops from Nigeria and
Rwanda to protect an estimated 80 cease-fire monitors in Darfur. The mandate of
these troops is to monitor a cease-fire agreement reached in April 2004 between the
government of Sudan and two rebel groups: the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) and
the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM).  In late September 2004, the government
of Sudan agreed to accept 3,500 more troops, although the mandate of the African
Union force does not allow it to protect civilians.  Meanwhile, in September,
negotiations between the government of Sudan and the SLA/JEM, under the auspices
of President Obasanjo of Nigeria, the current Chairman of the African Union, ended
without much progress.  On July 30, 2004, the United Nations Security Council
passed a resolution (1556) calling on the government of Sudan to disarm the
Janjaweed militia and to provide unfettered access for humanitarian relief agencies.
The resolution also imposed an arms embargo on “non-governmental entities and
individuals” in Darfur. In September, the Council passed Resolution 1564, calling on
the government of Sudan to cooperate with an expanded AU force and threatened
sanctions if the government fails to meet the Council’s demands. 
 
Meanwhile, Sudan remains divided by a civil war between the North and South,
and the three-fold negotiations are expected to concluded by the end of 2004. On
May 26, 2004, the government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation
Movement signed three protocols on Power Sharing, the Nuba Mountains and
Southern Blue Nile, and on the long disputed Abyei area.  The signing of these
protocols resolved all outstanding issues between the parties, although they must still
negotiate and agree on a comprehensive cease-fire and modalities for
implementation.  On June 5, 2004, the government of Sudan and the SPLM signed
the “Nairobi Declaration on the Final Phase of Peace in the Sudan.”  The declaration
restated that the parties have agreed on the following: the Machakos Protocol
(7/20/2002); Agreement on Security Arrangements (9/25/2003); Agreement on
Wealth Sharing (1/7/2004); Agreement on Power Sharing (5/26/2004); Protocol on
Southern Blue Nile and the Nuba Mountains (5/26/2004); and Protocol on the
disputed Abyei Area (5/26/2004).  Since the signing of the Nairobi Declaration,
however, the talks have been stalled.  For more information on Darfur and the North-
South negotiations, see CRS Issue Brief IB98043. This report will be updated as the
situation warrants.  
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Sudan: The Darfur Crisis and the Status of
the North-South Negotiations
The Crisis in Darfur
Background
The current crisis in Darfur began in February 2003, when two rebel groups
emerged to challenge the National Islamic Front (NIF) government in Darfur.  The
Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) claim
that the government of Sudan discriminates against Muslim African ethnic groups
in Darfur and has systematically targeted these ethnic groups since the early 1990s.
The government of Sudan dismisses the SLA and JEM as terrorists.  The conflict pits
the three African ethnic groups, the Fur, Zaghawa, and Massaleit, against nomadic
Arab ethnic groups.  Periodic tensions between the largely African-Muslim ethnic
groups and the Arab inhabitants of Darfur can be traced to the 1930s and most
recently surfaced in the 1980s.  Successive governments in Khartoum have long
neglected the African ethnic groups in Darfur and have done very little to prevent or
contain attacks by Arab militias against non-Arabs in Darfur.1  Non-Arab groups took
up arms against successive central governments in Khartoum, albeit unsuccessfully.
In the early 1990s, the NIF government, which came to power in 1989, began to arm
Arab militias and attempt to disarm the largely African ethnic groups. 
The Current Crisis
The current conflict in Darfur burgeoned when the government of Sudan and its
allied militia began a campaign of terror against civilians in an effort to crush a
rebellion and to punish the core constituencies of the rebels. At the core of the current
conflict is a struggle for control of political power and resources.  The largely
nomadic Arab ethnic groups often venture into the traditionally farming communities
of Darfur for water and grazing, at times triggering armed conflict between the two
groups.  Darfur is home to an estimated 7 million people and has more than 30 ethnic
groups, which fall into two major categories: African and Arab.  Both communities
are Muslim, and years of intermarriages have made racial distinctions impossible.
Fighting over resources is one of several factors that has led to intense infighting in
Darfur over the years.  Many observers believe that the NIF government has
systematically and deliberately pursued a policy of discrimination  and
marginalization of the African communities in Darfur, and has given  support to Arab
militias to suppress non-Arabs, whom it considers a threat to its hold on power.  In
2000, after the ouster of the founder of the NIF, Hassan al-Turabi, and a split within
the Islamist Movement, the government imposed a state of emergency and used its
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new authority to crack down on dissidents in Darfur.  By 2002, a little-known self
defense force of a largely Fur-dominated group emerged as the SLA, challenging
government forces in Darfur.
With the NIF regime internally in turmoil and mounting international pressure
to end Sudan’s North-South conflict, the SLA and JEM were able to gain the upper
hand in the initial phase of the conflict against government forces in early 2003, and
appeared well armed and prepared.  The rebels also enjoyed the support of the local
population, as well as officers and soldiers in the Sudanese army.  A significant
number of senior officers and soldiers in the Sudanese armed forces come from
Darfur. The SLA reportedly benefitted from outside support, including from fellow
Zaghawa in Chad and financial support from Darfur businessmen in the Persian Gulf.
The government of Sudan has accused Eritrea and the Sudan People’s Liberation
Movement/Army (SPLM/A) of providing support to the SLA.  
The government of Sudan has also accused the founder of the NIF, Hassan al-
Turabi, of having links with JEM.  Some observers say that Turabi, through his
supporters, provides political and financial support to JEM. In late March 2004,
Turabi was arrested along with a number of senior army officers.  The government
claimed that Turabi was behind an attempted coup, although officials in Khartoum
seemed to back away from that claim by mid-April 2004. In late September 2004, the
government of Sudan, once again, accused supporters of al-Turabi of an attempted
coup.  The government arrested more than 30 people, including military officials. 
The Military Campaign and Human Rights Abuses
In mid-2003, the government of Sudan significantly increased its presence in
Darfur by arming Arab militias, collectively known as the Janjaweed, and by
deploying the Popular Defense Force (PDF).  The Janjaweed, under the direction of
regular government forces, reportedly unleashed a campaign of terror against
civilians.2  The Arab militia engaged in what United Nations officials have described
as “ethnic cleansing” of the African ethnic groups of Darfur.  Men have been
summarily executed, women have been raped, and more than 200,000 people have
been forced into exile in neighboring countries.3  In early February 2004, the
government launched a major military offensive against the rebel forces, and in mid-
February 2004, President Omar Bashir, in a nationally televised speech, declared that
the security forces had crushed the SLA and JEM, and offered amnesty to the rebels.
The forceful expulsion of the mainly African ethnic groups from their homes
was done in a deliberate, sequenced, and systematic way, according to a briefing
paper on the Darfur crisis by the Office of U.N. Resident and Humanitarian
Coordinator for the Sudan.  The report describes the mechanisms used to cleanse the
area of non-Arabs by “total disengagement of administration and suspension of all
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government services.”4  These include suspension of most government functions,
including payment of salaries to government workers, and the abandonment of basic
government services, such as health care and law enforcement.  According to the
United Nations, once government officials  leave these communities, the people are
then accused of being rebel sympathizers and are targeted by government militias.
The Janjaweed  burn villages, loot the properties of the non-Arabs, abduct children,
rape women, and prevent people from returning to their homes.5 
Factors Contributing to the Darfur Crisis
The timing of the Darfur crisis caught some observers by surprise. After over
a decade of international isolation and devastating civil war, prospects for peace and
comprehensive political solution to Sudan’s long, debilitating political impasse
looked  promising. The government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation
Movement (SPLM) had reached a comprehensive peace agreement in May 2004,
after two years of intense negotiations.  The country witnessed two years of relative
peace and stability during the period of negotiations, while the NIF government
emerged from its international isolation.  When the Darfur crisis first erupted in early
2003, the government of Sudan seriously underestimated the challenge presented  by
the SLA and JEM, as it had  with other political and armed groups in different parts
of Sudan.  At that time, the government of Sudan and the SPLM had signed only the
Machakos Protocol (7/20/2002), the first of several North-South accords.  The
violence in Darfur began to intensify at the height of subsequent intense and
acrimonious negotiations over power sharing, security and wealth sharing
arrangements for the interim period, as agreed to in the Machakos Protocol. 
In February 2004, First Vice President Ali Osman Taha, the government’s chief
negotiator, told the mediators that he had to leave the talks to deal with the “Darfur
problem.”  In February 2004, the government of Sudan initiated a major military
campaign against the SLA and JEM and declared victory by the end of the month.
Attacks by government forces and the Janjaweed militia against civilians intensified
between February and June 2004, forcing tens of thousands of civilians to flee to
neighboring Chad.
Some observers assert that the Darfur crisis is directly linked to the North-South
negotiations.  Senior members of the government of Sudan opposed to the North-
South negotiations, observers  argue, used the Darfur crisis to divert attention from
the negotiations and to obstruct agreement between the government and the SPLM.
Since the beginning of the North-South negotiations, there has been a rift within the
ruling party related to the North-South talks.  A number of senior officials have been
sidelined over the past two years and two coups were attempted against the
government of President Omar Bashir. 
The crisis in Darfur intensified around the  time when  several important
agreements had been reached between the government of Sudan and the SPLM.  The
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government of Sudan has been under intense international pressure to conclude a
peace agreement with the SPLM.  On a number of occasions during the negotiations,
directly and through the mediators, representatives of the government of Sudan asked
for political alliance with the SPLM during the interim period.  They considered an
alliance with the SPLM as a possible insurance policy for their own political survival,
expecting intense political challenge from northern opposition forces.  The SPLM
rejected political alliance with the ruling party, arguing that there are major
philosophical and political differences between the two parties.
Senior government officials reportedly made some concessions during the
negotiations, expecting that they would then forge an alliance with the SPLM. Some
observers contend that the Darfur crisis is now being used in order to delay
implementation of the peace agreement reached in May 2004.  Since the signing of
the Nairobi Declaration in June 2004, there has been no progress in the
implementation of the peace agreement.  The chief IGAD mediator, General Lazarus
Sumbeiywo, concerned that the process has stalled, traveled to Sudan to meet with
President Bashir and Vice President Taha in August 2004.  The government of Sudan
rejected Sumbeiywo’s request for Vice President Taha to meet with Dr. John Garang
of SPLM to resolve outstanding issues.
Many observers assert that Khartoum’s response to the Darfur crisis is similar
in many ways to how the government of Sudan has handled counter-insurgency
challenges in other parts of the country.  The government of Sudan used tribal
militias in its counter-insurgency measures in southern Sudan, Nuba, and in eastern
Sudan.  For most of the 1990s, the government of Sudan used the Nuer tribe from the
Upper Nile region against the Dinka tribe by arming and training Nuer militia.  The
Nuer militia in coordination with government forces engaged in a campaign of terror
against Dinka civilians and the SPLA for most of the 1990s.  There are over a dozen
Nuer militia factions operating in southern Sudan, backed by the government of
Sudan.  In fact, one of the contentious issues in the cease-fire negotiations in mid-
2004 was what to do with these militia groups.  Similarly, the government of Sudan
used Arab militias, primarily from the Baggara tribes, in slave raids in Bahr el Ghazal
for most of the 1990s.  These militias were used to terrorize the civilian population
by killing the men and abducting women and children. In mid-2004, the government
of Sudan deployed Nuer militia to the Shilluk Kingdom, killing thousands of
civilians and forcing tens of thousands into refugee camps.  The attacks in Shilluk
Kingdom followed the defection of a former minister to the SPLM.  
Key Players in the Darfur Campaign 6
The government of Sudan’s response to the crisis in Darfur is a well thought-out
political and military strategy with multiple objectives, according to some observers.
President Omar el-Bashir, stunned by the humiliating defeat in El-Fashir in 2003 at
the hands of the rebels, clearly sought to crush the rebels at all costs.  The defeat at
El-Fashir left the army, an important constituency of Bashir, on the sidelines and
gave the security services the excuse to take the lead in the Darfur campaign.  This
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situation placed First Vice President Taha in charge of the Darfur campaign, since
he controls the security services in Sudan.  Taha, through some of his key allies in the
security services, managed to grab control and took charge of the offensive in Darfur,
according to U.S. and regional officials. However, at the height of the Darfur crisis,
Taha appeared more engaged in the North-South negotiations and not actively
engaged in the Darfur crisis.  But U.S. and regional officials  point to Taha as the key
player behind the scenes, even while he was negotiating in Naivasha with the SPLM.
 
According to a variety of sources, Vice President Taha worked through key
security officials considered to be Taha loyalists and committed Islamists of the
ruling party.  These include Salah Abdalla Gosh, head of the National Intelligence
Security Service (NISS), who reportedly has played key roles in coordinating the
recruitment and training of the Janjaweed and directing the security services in
attacks against civilians in Darfur; Dr. Nafie Ali Nafie, the former external
intelligence chief, a man long considered by U.S. and regional officials as responsible
for the government’s international terror links; and Abdalla Safi al-Nur, State
Minister for Cabinet Affairs, who is also considered key player in the Darfur
campaign.  Ahmed Mohamed Haroun, State Minister and former head of the Popular
Police Force, is also considered a key ally of Taha and an important player in the
Darfur campaign.  Ali Ahmed Karti, State Minister and former head of the Popular
Defense Force (PDF) — a group created by the National Islamic Front movement as
an alternative force to the regular armed forces; Tayeb Ibrahim Mohamed Kheir,
Security Advisor to the President; and Mutrif Sidiq, Undersecretary in the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, are all considered key players in the Darfur campaign.  These key
players, in the view of U.S. and regional officials, constitute an important faction
running the government’s military campaign in Darfur behind the scenes.  
The Bush Administration has not decided whether to name some of these
individuals publicly or impose targeted sanctions against them, as proposed by the
House of Representative and the Senate.  The Bush Administration has publicly
named a number of Janjaweed leaders.7  Members of Congress have named a number
of Janjaweed leaders, as well as government officials they consider responsible for
the atrocities in Darfur.  Some U.S. government officials believe that the above-
named individuals are directly involved in the Darfur campaign, but are concerned
that publicly identifying them and targeting them for sanctions could lead to
confrontation and help unify the government of Sudan.  Administration officials are
also concerned that going after these individuals could disrupt cooperation on
counter-terrorism issues, especially since some of these individuals have long been
tied to international terrorism.  For example, the head of the NISS, Abdalla Gosh, is
seen both as a key player in the Darfur campaign and an important actor in counter-
terrorism efforts, although some observers have doubts about the value of the
intelligence Khartoum may currently be offering.
CRS-6
8 U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID).  DARFUR-Humanitarian
Emergency Fact Sheet #15, Fiscal Year (FY)2004. July 23,2004
The Humanitarian Situation and the U.S. Response
Humanitarian Situation at a Glance
! Affected Population: 2.2 million.
! IDPs: 1.5 million.
! Refugees: 200,000
! Deaths: 70,000 (as of September 2004).
! U.S. Assistance: $218 Million as of September 2004.
Source: USAID/United Nations
According to United Nations and U.S. officials, the situation in Darfur is
considered to be one of the worst current humanitarian and human rights crises in the
world.  Out of a population of 7 million people, 1.5 million are internally displaced,
over 200,000 have been forced into exile, and tens of thousands of civilian have been
killed.  Since February 2003, USAID has provided an estimated $218 million in
humanitarian assistance for Darfur. Moreover, the Senate Foreign Operations
appropriations contains $611 million for Darfur and Sudan, and an additional$75
million was approved by the Senate for African Union peacekeeping operations.
USAID has also established a Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) for
Darfur, although the government of Sudan delayed the deployment of the team to
Darfur for several weeks. Recently the USAID/DART has expressed concern
regarding the government of Sudan’s plan to forcibly return internally displaced
persons to their places of origin.  Meanwhile, humanitarian conditions continue to
deteriorate, in large part because of continued government restrictions and violence
against civilians by the pro-government militia, the Janjaweed.  According to
USAID, “the GOS has imposed rigorous registration requirements that hinder
qualified health workers from entering Darfur.  These regulations are severely
affecting relief agencies’ capacity to respond to disease outbreaks anticipated in the
coming weeks.”8  Surveys conducted by NGOs indicate high rates of malnutrition in
many areas in Darfur.  USAID reports that the General Acute Malnutrition (GAM)
rates for children under five in Darfur are 13-39%, and 36-39% for refugee children
living in Eastern Chad. The World Food Program (WFP) is supporting 19 therapeutic
feeding centers for the extremely malnourished and 24 supplementary feeding
programs to help reduce the number of deaths resulting from starvation.
The African Union and the Crisis in Darfur
The African Union (AU) has been slow in responding to the crisis in Darfur.
The AU became actively engaged during the cease-fire negotiation in Chad and
subsequently assumed a central role in monitoring the ceasefire agreement and
facilitating political dialogue between the government of Sudan and SLA/JEM.  In
late March 2004, the AU sent a team led by Ambassador Sam Ibok, Director of the
AU’s Peace and Security Department, to participate in talks in Chad.  In the April
Cease-Fire Agreement, the African Union was tasked to take the lead in the creation
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of a Cease-Fire Commission.  The Commission’s mandate consists of “planning,
verifying and ensuring the implementation of the rules and provisions of the cease-
fire agreement.”  In addition, the Commission was mandated to define the routes for
the movement of the respective forces, assist with demining operations, and collect
information about cease-fire violations.  The Commission reports to a Joint
Commission composed of the parties to the agreement, Chad, and members of the
international community.  The African Union mission does not have the mandate to
protect civilians; however, the 305 troops from Rwanda and Nigeria are tasked to
protect the AU cease-fire monitors in Darfur.
The limited mandate of the AU force, logistical and financial troubles of the
organization, and the size of the force have made the AU mission inefficient,
according to many observers.  The deployment of the AU force, albeit small, took
more than four months after the signing of the agreement.  Moreover, even the
limited mandate of monitoring of the cease-fire agreement has not been effective.
The mandate does not have any enforcement mechanisms  aside from reporting the
violations to the Joint Commission.  Since the signing of the cease-fire agreement
and the deployment of the AU mission, there have been many violations and only a
limited number of the violations have been reported to the Joint Commission.
Moreover, no corrective measures have been taken by the AU to end these violations.
In September, Secretary General Kofi Annan reported that “It is clear that the
ceasefire is not holding in many parts of Darfur. Clashes were reported from 8-12
September in Sayyah, north of El Fasher, and Government aligned militia attacked
the SLA in Abu Dalek on 7 September.”9 
President Paul Kagame of Rwanda, who came to power after the 1994 Rwandan
genocide, had stated that his country would respond if called to end genocide during
a speech in April 2004 at the 10th anniversary of the Rwandan genocide. Rwanda was
the first to deploy troops as part of the AU mission.  Senior Rwandan officials have
also asserted that despite the limited mandate, Rwandan troops would defend
civilians, if they are attacked.  Rwanda has not yet followed through its threat,
however, despite continued attacks against civilians over the past several months.
Rwandan government officials argue that it is better to have a small force present in
Darfur than have nothing at all.  However, Kigali has made its views clear that the
proposed expanded force should have a mandate to protect civilians.  Many members
of the African Union do not share the view that a genocide is occurring in Darfur and
still consider the government of Sudan as the central player in the resolution of the
conflict and protector of civilians, while U.S. and U.N. officials hold the government
of Sudan responsible for the atrocities in Darfur.
In late September 2004, as noted above, the government of Sudan and the AU
agreed to expand the AU mission by over 3500 troops, several weeks after the United
Nations Security Council endorsed an expanded mission for the AU and threatened
sanctions if the government failed to cooperate.  Many observers contend that the
proposed increase in the force protection is not enough since Darfur is the size of
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France.  Moreover, they argue, the mandate of the AU force is still not clear.  The
government of Sudan has rejected a proposal to expand the mandate to  include
protection of civilians, especially the internally displaced people (IDP) in camps
throughout Darfur.  The government of Sudan has also rejected the use of the phrase
“peacekeeping;” instead the force is likely to retain its current label, protectors of
cease-fire monitors.  Rwanda has reportedly offered to send more troops to Darfur.
But observers and U.S. officials assert it will take months to deploy additional troops
to Darfur. U.S. officials are concerned that the AU might not be able to deploy new
forces until early 2005, given the number of complications that must first be resolved.
The African Union and the government of Sudan have to agree on the mandate and
size of the new force.  Moreover, resources and logistical support to transport the
troops have to be secured, especially with donor governments with the capability to
move these troops from their respective countries to Darfur.
Prospects for a Negotiated Settlement in Darfur
 
In September 2003, the government of Sudan and the SLA signed a cease-fire
agreement mediated by President Idriss Deby of Chad.  The agreement collapsed in
December 2003.  In early April 2004, the government of Sudan and the SLA/JEM
agreed to a cease-fire and political dialogue to peacefully resolve the conflict. The
government of Sudan agreed to negotiate with the rebels after considerable
international pressure.  The negotiations were conducted under the auspices of
President Deby of Chad and assisted by the African Union.  The United States and
other international participants played an important role in facilitating the
negotiations, although the government of Sudan delegation walked out of the talks
in protest when the head of the U.S. delegation began to deliver his opening remarks.
 
On April 8, 2004, the parties agreed to observe a cease-fire for a period of 45
days, renewable automatically if both parties were to agree.  In late May, the parties
renewed the cease-fire agreement.  However, attacks by the pro-government militia
have been verified by the cease-fire commission established under the April 8th
accord. These violations by the government of Sudan and the Janjaweed militia have
stalled the peace negotiation process.  Leaders from the Justice and Equality
Movement (JEM) and the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) initially refused to
participate in talks in July  in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia  because the GOS failed to
uphold the core elements of the April 8th cease-fire agreement.  In late August 2004,
the parties resumed negotiations in Abuja, Nigeria. There has been no major
breakthrough as of September 2, 2004, although the parties were expected to reach
an agreement on humanitarian related issues.  Political agreement between the rebels
and the government of Sudan appears unlikely at this juncture. The SLA and JEM are
demanding fundamental changes in the political structure in Khartoum and the
disarmament of the Janjaweed. 
The April cease-fire agreement (see text box) provided a framework for a
negotiated settlement between GOS and the SLA/JEM, but the agreement has not
been fully implemented. The African Union and the United Nations have
documented a series of violations by the government of Sudan, including bombings
of civilian targets and continued support for the Janjaweed militia by the government
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of Sudan.  A recent report by the Secretary General of the United Nations states that
“the United Nations continues to receive reports of militia activities in all three states
of Darfur.  Of particular concern are several militia attacks on villages in the Yassin
area, northeast of Nyala, during the second half of August.”10  The report notes that
“to the extent the militias that carried out these attacks were under the influence of
the government, the wanton destruction of the villages and the killings of a large
number of civilians constitutes a serious breach of the government’s commitments.”
Highlights of the Cease-Fire Agreement (April 8, 2004)
The parties agreed to:
! Find a political solution to the problem.
! Cease all hostile media campaigns.
! Accept a 45-day cease-fire (renewed in May 2004).
! Establish a Cease-fire Commission and a Joint Commission. 
! Free all political prisoners.
! Control their allies and ensure compliance with the agreement.
! Facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance.
Some observers contend that there are also serious structural problems in the
negotiating process.  The April cease-fire agreement accepted the SLA and JEM as
legitimate political actors and called for a political solution to the problem facing
Darfur.  But recent measures by the Security Council and proposals by the African
Union mediators suggest that the SLA and JEM would be cantoned and disarmed in
similar fashion as the disarmament of the Janjaweed.  Security Council resolution
1556 imposed arms embargo on “non-government” entities and individuals in Darfur.
The “non-government” armed entities in Darfur are the SLA, JEM, and the
Janjaweed.  The embargo exempts the government of Sudan and does not provide
mechanisms to ensure that the government of Sudan will not continue to arm and
support the Janjaweed.  Reportedly, the government of Sudan is inducting the
Janjaweed into the Popular Defense Force (PDF), an Arab dominated irregular force.
United Nations and African Union reports clearly indicate that the government of
Sudan continues to provide support to the Janjaweed and coordinate attacks against
civilians.  
The current negotiations, observers contend, treat the SLA/JEM in the same
fashion as the Janjaweed.  The SLA and JEM have stated on a number of occasions
that the April cease-fire agreement is being re-written to accommodate the
government of Sudan.  The rebels argue that if they are forced to surrender or be
cantoned in a security zone, the government of Sudan will have no interest in finding
a political solution to the Darfur problem. Thus, a political settlement appears
unlikely in the immediate future, although the rebels’ lack of experience in
negotiations and possible defections could lead to a temporary agreement. 
Moreover, recent agreements between the United Nations and the government
of Sudan can be seen as undermining the April 2004 Cease-fire Agreement and
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impeding the work of the African Union Cease-fire Commission.  Article 2 of the
April Agreement on Humanitarian Cease-fire on the Conflict in Darfur calls for both
parties to refrain from any military movement and  reconnaissance operations. And
Article 4 of the Cease-fire Agreement empowers the Commission to approve the
movements of the forces of the two parties to the Agreement.  But a Joint
Communique signed between the government of Sudan and the U.N. (August 2004)
permits the government to deploy a “police force in all IDP areas as well as in areas
susceptible to attacks.” This means the government of Sudan could deploy forces
near or in SLA-controlled areas, where there are an estimated 130,000 IDPs. In
addition, the Darfur Plan of Action (August 2004), another agreement between the
UN and the government Sudan, authorizes the government to secure areas in Darfur
within 30 days, giving the government of Sudan the authority to deploy security
forces in the contested areas without the approval of the AU Commission. 
In September 2004, after several weeks of talks between the government of
Sudan and Darfur rebels, negotiations ended without progress, although talks are
expected to resume in late October 2004.  Some observers are concerned that conflict
might erupt once again in Darfur.
Visits by U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell and
U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan
In June 2004, Secretary Colin Powell became  the first U.S. Secretary of State
to visit Sudan in  26 years.  The purpose of his visit was to witness and express
concern for the people of Darfur, who he said  are subject to the “worst humanitarian
crisis in the world.”  The Secretary discussed with Sudan’s President Omar Al-Bashir
the necessity of  dismantling of the Janjaweed militia in order to restore security to
region.  He emphasized that the IDPs and refugees could return to their homes only
when security is restored in Darfur, and that until then they should remain in the
camps.  At this meeting  the government agreed to a list of objectives and a time line
in which they will be accomplished.  Objectives included the removal of all
restrictions on visas for humanitarian workers; the unimpeded movement of
humanitarian supplies, relief convoys, and vehicles for the monitors in Darfur; the
commitment of participating in a political resolution of the Darfur crisis facilitated
by the African Union; the disarmament of the Janjaweed; and the provision of
security to the displaced persons so they can return home.  
On June 30, Secretary Powell visited Darfur’s Abu-Shouk camp with Sudanese
Government representatives.  The Abu-Shouk camp is regarded as one of the best
camps in the Darfur region, although NGO leaders still expressed the need for more
shelters and clean water to Powell.  Upon his return to Khartoum Secretary Powell
met with U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan, who had arrived earlier that day to
begin his own three-day fact-finding mission.  During the meeting Powell informed
Annan about the steps the United States wanted Sudan to implement in order to
resolve the Darfur crisis; in turn, Annan briefed Powell about his earlier meeting with
Cabinet ministers prior to Powell’s departure from Sudan that day.  The following
day Annan was scheduled to visit three IDP camps to make a first hand assessment
of the situation in Darfur.  While at the Zam Zam camp in Northern Darfur, Annan
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listened to first hand accounts of the human rights abuses committed by the
Janjaweed including the  targeted rape, murder, and destruction of African villages.
However, when he arrived at his second destination, the Meshtel camp, he found it
deserted.  He was later informed by Sudanese representatives that the 5,000 IDPs
were moved to better living conditions in Abu-Shouk sometime between the
afternoon of June 30 and morning of July 1.  Relief workers at Abu-Shouk later
reported that they received no prior notification and were unprepared for the massive
influx of new arrivals. 
Annan echoed the U.S. demands for the disarmament of the Janjaweed militias
and the removal of all impediments to humanitarian relief. Upon returning to
Khartoum from Chad the Secretary General had one final meeting with President Al-
Bashir to discuss what was observed  in the camps.  At that time he also presented
the president with a draft Joint Communique that committed  the government of the
Sudan and the United Nations to taking specific steps to alleviate the suffering of the
Sudanese IDPs and refugees. During the visits of the Secretary General and the
Secretary of State, the government of Sudan carried out a number of attacks against
civilians, according to several newspaper accounts and reports by United Nations
officials.  In late August, two months after these high profile visits and demands by
the international community to stop these violent attacks, Secretary General Kofi
Annan reported to  the Security Council that “recent actions by the government of
Sudan armed forces involve a level of violence that seems at odds with the principle
of restraints it promised to observe under the Plan of Action.”
The International Community’s Response
The international community’s response to the Darfur crisis has been
characterized as slow and ineffective, in part because of the government of Sudan’s
repeated refusal to allow relief workers into Darfur.  It was not until late 2003, almost
one year after the crisis erupted, that some members of the international community
began to speak about gross human rights abuses and a widespread humanitarian crisis
in Darfur.  According to some analysts, the Bush Administration did not consider the
Darfur crisis to be a priority; instead the Administration was largely focused on the
talks between the government of Sudan and the SPLM.  The first statement on Darfur
by the White House was issued in early April 2004.  Others point out that U.S.
Agency for International Development (USAID) officials spoke of a growing
humanitarian crisis and visited the area in late 2003.  Administration officials were
reportedly concerned that forceful statements or measures against the government of
Sudan might undermine the peace process between the GOS and the SPLM.  Since
late 2003, however some U.N. officials have been forceful in their statements and
have publicly expressed concerns about the deteriorating humanitarian conditions in
Darfur. 
By May 2004, the international community was paying greater attention to the
crisis in Darfur, as violence against  civilians continued.  On July 26, 2004, in an
effort to press the government of Sudan to protect citizens in Darfur against the
Janjaweed, the U.S. and EU signed a Joint Declaration on Sudan.  This Declaration
condemned the human rights abuses, and called the GOS to immediately stop the
CRS-12
violence, disarm the militias, protect humanitarian workers and civilians, and allow
access to Darfur by humanitarian groups.  The following day,  July 27, 2004,
Britain’s top military commander, Gen. Mike Jackson, said his country could send
5,000 troops to intervene in Darfur.  Australia also pledged to send troops to Darfur.
The government of Sudan responded that it would use force against any attempt at
outside military intervention in Darfur.  
Highlights of the SG Report to the Security Council (August 30, 2004)
! The disarming of members of the PDF has started.
! The United Nations continues to receive reports of militia activities
in all three states of Darfur.
! To date, the Government has not identified any militias that are
currently outside the PDF.
! Recent actions by the government of Sudan armed forces involve a
level of violence that seems at odds with the principles of restraint it
promised to observe under the Plan of Action.
! No forced return of the IDPs is taking place in accordance with the
commitments made by the Government. However, local authorities
continue to apply direct and indirect pressure.
! An active and systematic effort to end impunity does not yet seem to
be in place.
Source: Report of the Secretary General pursuant to paragraphs 6 and 13 to 16 of Security
Council resolution 1556.  August 30, 2004.
On July 30, 2004 the U.N. Security Council passed resolution 1556 (2004),
demanding that Sudan disarm militias in Darfur within 30 days or face measures
outline in Article 41 of the United Nations Charter. The resolution passed by a vote
of 13 in favor and two abstentions (China and Pakistan). However, the resolution
stopped short of overtly calling for sanctions against the Government of Sudan, a
compromise deemed  necessary for passage. Following the passage of the resolution
1556, French President Jacques Chirac announced that France would make aircraft
available from its military base in Chad to assist in the transport of humanitarian
supplies, and deployed 200 troops near the Sudanese border to assist in securing the
area. Meanwhile, the African Union deployed 300 Rwandan and Nigerian troops to
Darfur as military observers and force protectors.  The AU plans to deploy several
thousand additional troops to Darfur, although final agreement has not been reached
with the government of Sudan. 
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U.N.S.C. Resolution 1564 (September, 2004)
! Expresses grave concern about lack of security.
! States that GOS is responsible for the security and safety of the
population.
! Declares the situation in Sudan as a threat to international peace
and security.
! Deplores recent cease-fire violations by GOS.
! Supports the African Union’s plan to enhance and augment its
monitoring mission in Darfur.
! Calls on member states to provide financial and logistical
support to the AU mission.
! Threatens the GOS with sanctions, including measures
targeting its petroleum sector, if it fails to comply with the
Council’s demands.
Source: United Nations.
On August 30, 2004, in his report to the Security Council, Secretary General
Kofi Annan stated that the government of Sudan has failed to fulfil its commitment
to disarm the Janjaweed militia.  Jan Pronk, the Secretary General’s Special
Representative for Sudan, however, stated that the government of Sudan has made
“some progress” in disarming the Janjaweed and asserted that there were no recent
attacks by government troops against civilians in Darfur.  U.S. Ambassador to the
U.N. and former Bush Administration Special Envoy for Sudan, Senator John
Danforth, publicly rebuked Pronk for downplaying atrocities and government
complicity in attacks against civilians.  In response to criticism as to why he did not
include the findings of African Union monitors about recent attacks, Pronk stated that
the AU report is preliminary and that he was awaiting for a final report.  Some
observers believe that Pronk’s lukewarm criticism of the government of Sudan has
given pro-Sudan Security Council members an excuse to reject U.S. calls for
sanctions against the government of Sudan. In September, the Security Council once
again passed another resolution (1564), calling on the government of Sudan to
cooperate with the African Union and end the violence against civilians.  The
resolution stated that measures against the government of Sudan or officials in the
government  could be taken if they failed to meet the Council’s demands.
The Debate Over Genocide11
On July 22, 2004,  the U.S. House of Representatives and the Senate
unanimously passed  resolutions (H.Con.Res 467, S.Con.Res. 133)declaring the crisis
in Darfur to be genocide, based on the five criteria for genocide enumerated in
Article 2 of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide. A wide array of American and international non-governmental
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organizations, human rights activists and newspaper editorials have termed the
violence in Darfur “genocide,” although the United Nations and the African Union
have refrained from officially declaring the atrocities in Darfur to be genocide.  The
Bush Administration sent a team of investigators to Chad to interview victims of the
Darfur atrocities.  The team submitted its draft report in August and the final report
was  released in September. The report is based on interviews with 1,136 randomly
selected refugees in 19 refugee camps in eastern Chad.  According to the report,
Analysis of the refugee interviews points to a pattern of abuse against members
of Darfur’‘ non-Arab communities, including murder, rape, beatings, ethnic
humiliation, and destruction of property and basic necessities. Many of the
reports detailing attacks on villages refer to government and militia forces,
preceded by aerial bombardment, acting together to commit atrocities.
Respondents said government and militia forces wore khaki or brown military
uniforms. Roughly one-half of the respondents noted GOS forces had joined
Jingaweit irregulars in attacking their villages. Approximately one-quarter of the
respondents said GOS forces had acted alone; another 14 percent said the
Jingaweit had acted alone. Two-thirds of the respondents reported aerial
bombings against their villages; four-fifths said they had witnessed the complete
destruction of their villages. Sixty-one percent reported witnessing the killing of
a family member. About one-third of the respondents reported hearing racial
epithets while under attack; one-quarter witnessed beatings. Large numbers
reported the looting of personal property (47 percent) and the theft of livestock
(80 percent).12
On September 9,2004, Secretary Powell, in his testimony before the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, declared the atrocities in Darfur genocide.  Secretary
Powell stated that, after reviewing evidence collected by the State Department team,
“genocide has been committed in Darfur and that the Government of Sudan and the
Jingaweit bear responsibility — and that genocide may still be occurring.” Powell
further stated that because the United States is a contracting party to the Geneva
Convention, Washington will demand that the United Nations “initiate a full
investigation.” Shortly after Powell’s testimony, a draft U.S. resolution (1564) was
adopted.  The resolution requested the Secretary General of the United Nations to
“establish an international commission of inquiry in order immediately to investigate
reports of violations of international humanitarian law and human rights law in
Darfur by all parties, to determine also whether or not acts of genocide have
occurred, and to identify the perpetrators of such violations with a view to ensuring
that those responsible are held accountable.” The declaration of genocide by the Bush
Administration has not led to a major shift in policy nor a threat of intervention to
end genocide. Instead, Bush Administration officials continue to support a negotiated
settlement between the rebels and the government of Sudan. 
Some observers and government officials have described the atrocities in Darfur
as “ethnic cleansing,” and reject that genocide has occurred in Darfur. The term
“ethnic cleansing” originated during the Bosnian conflict of the early 1990s, evolving
from a military term meaning “to clear the land.”  Over time, the term has come to
be used generally to describe certain targeted acts of violence against non-combatants
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in conflict situations, including their expulsion from their homes.  An act of ethnic
cleansing may rise to one of the following charges under international law: war
crimes, crimes against humanity, or genocide.  International law experts assert that
proving that a group not only destroyed a substantial part of another group, but
intentionally did so, makes prosecuting genocide challenging. In the case of
Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstic, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia convicted Krstic of genocide against Bosnian Muslims in Srebenica,
stating that it is not only bald numbers that need evaluation within the context of the
overall size of the group, but also the targeted portion’s prominence within the group.
Some human rights lawyers and experts in international law contend that a
specific part of a group can easily qualify as a “substantial” portion of a group if that
part is emblematic of the overall group, or essential to its survival.  In rendering
judgment in the case of The Prosecutor v. Georges Anderson Nderubumwe
Rutaganda, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda stated that
[g]enocide is distinct from other crimes because it requires dolus specialis, {a
special intent. . .} The perpetration of the act charged, therefore, extends beyond
its actual commission, for example, the murder of a particular person, to
encompass the realization of the ulterior purpose to destroy, in whole or in part,
the group of which the person is only a member. . . The dolus specialis is a key
element of an intentional offence, which offence is characterized by a
psychological nexus between the physical result and the mental state of the
perpetrator.
To convict an individual of genocide, it is necessary to prove the targeting of a
specific ethnic group or groups, and efforts to prevent the group - or a substantial part
of it - from surviving. 
In the case of Darfur, specific groups have been targeted by the government of
Sudan and its allied militia, according to many Sudan advocates.  The target of these
attacks have been three African Muslim ethnic groups belonging to Fur, Zaghawa,
and Massaleit.  Those who carried out the attacks against these groups come
primarily from Sudan’s Arab Muslim ethnic groups.  Article 2 of the Convention on
the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide states that “in the present
Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with the intent to
destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: (a)
killing members of the group; (b) causing serious bodily or mental harm to members
of the group; (c) deliberately inflicting on the groups’ conditions of life calculated to
bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) imposing measures
intended to prevent births within the group; and (e) forcibly transferring children of
the group to another group.”  
Many observers, including the U.S. House of Representatives and the Senate,
contend that the atrocities in Darfur meet the criteria outlined in the 1948
Convention.  They argue that members of a particular group have been killed (a);
serious bodily harm had been inflicted on the group (b); the group’s conditions of life
had been deliberately destroyed through burning of villages and poisoning of water
wells; there has been systematic and widespread rape of women (c); and children
have been abducted and forced to flee their homes.  Others argue that the crisis in
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Darfur is a conflict between tribes, triggered by a number of factors, including
resources and political power.  
The Darfur Crisis and Impact on the
North-South Negotiations
On May 26, 2004, the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation
Movement signed three protocols on Power Sharing, the Nuba Mountains and
Southern Blue Nile, and on the long disputed Abyei area.  The signing of these
protocols resolved all outstanding issues between the parties, although the parties
must still negotiate and agree on a comprehensive cease-fire and modalities for
implementation.  On June 5, 2004, the government of Sudan and the SPLM signed
the “Nairobi Declaration on the Final Phase of Peace in the Sudan.”  The declaration
restated that the parties have agreed on the following: the Machakos Protocol
(7/20/2002); Agreement on Security Arrangements (9/25/2003); Agreement on
Wealth Sharing (1/7/2004); Agreement on Power Sharing (5/26/2004); Protocol on
Southern Blue Nile and the Nuba Mountains (5/26/2004); and Protocol on the
disputed Abyei Area (5/26/2004).  
Since the signing of the Nairobi Declaration, the talks have been stalled, in part
because of the crisis in Darfur. Some observers fear that the peace agreement may
collapse if progress is not made soon.  Both sides are beginning to rearm and
violations of the cease-fire agreement have increased in recent months. The Troika
— Norway, Britain, and the United States — have not been not actively engaged in
the North-South negotiations since the signing of the Nairobi Declaration.  The two
principal actors, Dr. John Garang and Vice President Taha, have not met since the
signing of the Nairobi Declaration in early June 2004.  Meanwhile, tensions are
mounting in eastern Sudan, with the Beja Congress poised to launch a military
offensive against government forces.  Senior commanders in the SPLA are reportedly
also raising questions about the delay and the commitment of the government of
Sudan.  Others argue that it would be difficult, if not impossible, to work with the
current government of Sudan after what has happened in Darfur.
The SPLM leader, Dr. John Garang, argues that swift implementation of the
IGAD-led Naivasha Accords will help end the violence in Darfur.13  In his view,
implementation of the Accords will lead to a new government, of which the SPLM
and other political forces will be a part.  In his view, this power-sharing deal will
enable these forces to check the political power of the current government and
prevent military actions against civilians, since such measures will require the
approval of the SPLM in a coalition government, as agreed to in the power sharing
and security arrangements at Naivasha, Kenya.  The SPLM has also proposed the
deployment of 30,000 troops to Darfur to disarm the Janjaweed and provide
protection to civilians.  According to the SPLM, the force will consist of 10,000
troops from the SPLA, 10,000 from the Sudan Armed Forces, and 10,000 from the
African Union.  The proposal has been rejected by the government of Sudan,
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although the SPLM and the government had agreed on the security arrangements for
the interim period to set up Joint Integrated Units.  Moreover, senior government
officials see the SPLA as an ally of the SLA.  
The government of Sudan’s refusal to engage other Sudanese political groups
in an effort to find a political solution in Darfur raises fundamental questions about
the government’s intent to implement the Naivasha Accords and its commitment to
a negotiated settlement of the Darfur problem.  The government of Sudan has
strenuously resisted outside intervention to deal with the Darfur problem and has
threatened a Jihad against such intervention by outsiders. An alternative to outside
intervention, some observers maintain, is to bring other Sudanese political groups
into the process.  But senior government officials in Khartoum see the Darfur crisis
as a conspiracy by the West to overthrow the government, although many in the
international community hold the government itself accountable for the crisis in
Darfur.  By rejecting SPLM’s proposal, resisting international interventions, and
delaying implementation of the Naivasha Accords, the government of Sudan may risk
an all-out war since opposition forces, including the SPLA, are unlikely to wait
indefinitely.  Such a scenario may pose not only serious consequences for Sudan, but
also for the entire region. 
Many observers believe that the parties could start implementation of the
already signed agreements.  The two remaining issues are finalizing a cease-fire
agreement and negotiating implementation modalities.  The parties, with the help of
IGAD, United Nations, and the Troika, have reached agreement on a framework for
a permanent cease-fire.  What remain unresolved are three issues brought up anew
by the government of Sudan that had been settled in the Nairobi Declaration. The
status of armed militia had been settled in the Security Arrangements.  The parties
agreed to disarm all armed elements outside the two principal forces, the Sudan
Armed Forces and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army.  The government of Sudan
would now like a separate agreement for more than a dozen pro-government armed
militia.  The parties also agreed that the two principal armies would be treated
equally and as the national armies of the country. In the cease-fire negotiations, the
government of Sudan raised objections concerning central government funding to the
SPLA.  Another issue raised by the government as new during cease-fire negotiation
was the status of the Joint Integrated Unit in Eastern Sudan.  The parties agreed to
discuss this issue during cease-fire negotiations. The government of Sudan now
claims this issue had been settled in the Security Arrangement agreement.
Policy Options on Darfur and the
North-South Negotiations
The United States has a number of unilateral and multilateral policy options to
consider in dealing with the Darfur crisis and the stalled North-South talks. These
options are complicated by a number of factors.  Members of the international
community are divided over Sudan. Since the late 1990s, the European Union has
adopted a policy of engagement, instead of containment, as the United States pursued
a policy of isolation and containment of the government of Sudan.  Sudan’s
neighbors are also divided.  Relations between Eritrea and Sudan are poor, while
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Ethiopia’s relations with the NIF government have improved significantly over the
past several years.  For the number of the options outlined below to be successful,
close cooperation and coordination between the United States and the international
community, especially the Security Council and Sudan’s neighbors is pivotal. 
Engagement. One option is engagement with the Government of Sudan. The
government of Sudan is eager to appease the international community as long as it
can avoid punitive sanctions and ensure its own political survival.  In this scenario,
engaging the government might yield some positive results, short of full cooperation
and accountability by the government.  Past engagement with the current
government, however, has not succeeded in changing the behavior of the National
Islamic Front government. 
Working With Moderates. Another option is working with the so-called
moderates within the Sudan government. U.S. and regional officials assert that the
international community should work with the so-called moderate elements in the
government by isolating hardliners within the government.  There are a number
officials in the Sudanese government who prefer to work with the international
community in order to ensure the regime’s political survival.  Strengthening the
position of these more moderate elements, however, entails great risks and a possible
backlash from the extremist elements in the regime. 
Sanctions. Many observers assert that the current regime only responds to real
pressure.  The threat of sanctions in July 2004 by the United Nations Security
Council may have led to Khartoum’s reluctant cooperation in recent weeks.  The
Clinton Administration imposed comprehensive economic and trade sanctions in
1997; the impact of these sanctions are mixed.  But targeted sanctions, including an
oil and arms embargo, travel ban and asset freeze, might have serious psychological
and political impact on the regime.  But the government of Sudan has survived years
of sanctions imposed by the United States and the United Nations. Moreover, many
countries oppose sanctions against the government of Sudan, especially those
countries with business interests in Sudan’s oil sector.
Regime Change. Some observers and Sudan opposition leaders argue that the
regime is incapable of change.  They argue that since the NIF government came to
power in 1989, it has committed war crimes in south Sudan, the Nuba, and now in
Darfur.  They also point to the regime’s known ties to international terrorism and
Osama bin Laden.  A regime change in Khartoum, they argue, could bring a swift end
to the crisis in Darfur, help implement the North-South agreement, and end the
regime’s support to extremist and terrorist groups.  Some observers argue that
opposition forces could topple the NIF regime without outside support. But 20-years
of war has led to a stalemate.  Moreover, opposition groups are divided along
regional and ethnic lines.  
Implementing the North-South Agreements. Sudanese opposition
leaders and regional officials argue that a better alternative to forceful or violent
change in government is expedited implementation of the Naivasha Accords, which
could lead to a peaceful change in government in Khartoum.  Implementation of the
Naivasha Accords, as agreed between the government of Sudan and the SPLM,
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would lead to a coalition government, with a new first vice president from the SPLM,
a new national assembly, a new cabinet, and a revamped security apparatus. 
International Intervention. Another option is military intervention by the
international community. The international community could disarm the Janjaweed
and provide protection to civilians in Darfur by deploying large numbers of
peacekeepers with a Chapter VII mandate. The UN has been working on a
peacekeeping force for Sudan as part of the Naivasha Agreement over the past year.
The proposed 10,000 troops for the South could be modified for deployment to
Darfur, especially in light of the fact that the current AU force, even if increased by
several thousand, may be incapable of providing protection to civilians or disarming
the Janjaweed.  The AU force is mandated only to protect AU cease-fire monitors.
U.S. officials and human rights organizations have documented attacks on civilians





Called for an end to slavery and human rights abuses in Sudan.  Introduced
April 10, 2003.  Passed House July 16, 2003.
H.Con.Res. 402(Tancredo)
Calls for an investigation of Sudanese officials involved in international
terrorism. Introduced March 30, 2004.
H.Con.Res. 403 (Wolf)
Condemns the government of Sudan for violations of human rights in Darfur
State.  Introduced April 1, 2004; passed House May 17, 2004.
H.Con.Res. 467 (Payne)
Declares the humanitarian crisis in Darfur, Sudan as genocide.  Introduced June
24, 2004; passed House July 22, 2004.
S. 2705 (Biden)
Condemns the government of Sudan for violations of human rights and
authorizes funds in support of peace and for humanitarian purposes. Introduced July
21, 2004.
S. 2720 (Lugar)
Condemns the government of Sudan for violations of human rights in Darfur.
Authorizes $300 million, including $200 for Darfur.  Introduced July 22, 2004.
S.Con.Res. 133 (Brownback)
Declares genocide in Darfur, Sudan.  Introduced and passed Senate July 22,
2004.
S.Con.Res. 137 (Frist)
Urges the United Nations to suspend Sudan from the United Nations Human
Rights Commission. Introduced September 15, passed same day.  Passed House
September 22.
S. 2781 (Lugar)
Calls for comprehensive peace in Sudan, authorizes $300 million for
humanitarian and development purposes, and proposes sanctions.  Introduced
September 9, passed with amendments by Unanimous Consent.
H.R. 5061 (Tancredo) 
Imposes sanctions on the government of Sudan, authorizes $450 million for
humanitarian and development purposes, and exempts opposition-controlled areas
from current sanctions. Introduced September 9, 2004.
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Appendix 1. State Department List of
Janjaweed Leaders
Janjaweed Commanders and Coordinators
1. Musa Hilal, Janjaweed Coordinator
2. Hamid Dawai, leader in Terbeba-Arara-Bayda triangle
3. Abdullah abu Shineibat, leader in Murnei
4. Omar Babbush, leader in Habila and Forbranga
5. Omada Saef, leader in Misterei
6. Ahmed Dekheir, leader in Murnei
7. Ahmed Abu Kamasha, Kailek region
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Appendix 2. List Issued by Members of Congress14
First Category: Top GOS officials who are supervising and
controlling Janjaweed activities and operations include the
following: 
1. Ali Osman Taha, 1st Vice President
2. Major General Salah Abdalla (Gosh), Director General GOS Security
3. Dr. Nafie Ali Nafie, (Former External Intelligence Chief)
4. Major General Al Tayeb Mohammed Kheir, Presidential Security Advisor
5. Abdalhamid Musa Kasha, Minister of Commerce
6. Abdalrahim Mohammed Hussein, Minister of Interior
7. Major General Adam Hamid Musa, State Governor — Southern Darfur
8. Brigadier Mohamed Ahmed Ali, Riot Police Director——led policy attacks on
IDPs  at Mayo Camp (Khartoum) in mid-March.
9. Mohamed Yousef Abdala, Humanitarian Affairs State Minister.
10. Abdalla Safi el Nur, Cabinet Minister/General Coordinator of Janjaweed
Second Category: Coordination and Command Council of
Janjaweed
1. Lt. Col Sukeirtalah, Leader of Janjaweed——Geneina
2. Ahmed Mohammed Haroun, Coordinator——State Minister of Interior
3. Osman Yusif Kibir, State Governor Darfur
4. El Tahir Hassan Abbud, NCP
5. Mohammed Salih Al Sunusi Baraka, Member of the National Assembly
6. Mohammed Yusif El Tileit, Western Darfur State Minister
7. Major General Hussein Abdalla Jibril, Member of the National Assembly
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Third Category: Field Command
1. Brigadier Musa Hilal
2. Brigadier Hamid Dhawai
3. Brigadier Abdal Wahid, Kabkabiya Sector
4. Brigadier Mohammed Ibrahim Ginesto
5. Major Hussein Tangos
6. Major Omer Baabas 
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Appendix 3. Projected Mortality Rates in Darfur,
Sudan 2004-2005
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Appendix 4. Confirmed Damaged and Destroyed
Villages
Source: USAID.
